Speaker-independent recognition. Figure l a shows the basic processing stages that occur when an acoustic signal is presented for speaker-independent recognition. A segmentation stage determines where the utterance begins and ends in the continuous input stream, a problem made difficult by background noise in natural environments. Once segmented, the utterance passes through a set of digital filters. Time normalization is then performed and acoustic features are extracted from the filter outputs. This preprocessing produces a fixed-size vector of about a hundred elements that serves as input to a neural-network recognizer. On the basis of the context in which the utterance is made, a network is selected that has the appropriate set of response alternatives. The network models the probability distribution of each word class, conditional on the input pattern. Included among the response alternatives is a "none of the above" category, into which any word or sound that's not a member of the recognition set is classified.
As is typical in neural-net applications, an appropriate input representation is essential. Because the input representation is at least as important to the recognizer's success as the type of classifier used, we have put much effort into selecting optimal filter parameters and feature-extraction algorithms. Having an appropriate corpus of training examples is also crucial to the recognizer's success. Sensory employs a staff of linguists who collect speech samples, roughly 400 per vocabulary word. They try to match the distribution of speakers in the training corpus with the distribution of eventual users of the product, by age, gender, and regional accent. They also match conditions of data collection to conditions of eventual usagenoisy environments, room echoes, and the speaker's physical state. Neural-net training occurs off line, using the grab bag of tricks that have become standard in the field, including cross validation and Bayesian methods for model selection, the adding of weight constraints between neighboring input frames, and ensemble methods. Altogether, over 2,000 networks are trained in selecting the one that will end up in the application product.
Speaker-independent recognition with a vocabulary of a dozen alternatives achieves recognition accuracies better than 95% in actual use. I Speaker-dependent recognition. In semiconductors category. In addition to ~ speaker-dependent recognition, the user 1 the RSC-164, Sensory has developed two trains the system by speaking several examples of each vocabulary item. These examples serve as templates, which the system then serially compares with an unknown input pattern. Figure 1 b shows the basic processing stages involved in this comparison. Dynamic time warping aligns the unknown pattern to the template. The standard speech-recognition approach is to use the alignment score as the measure of how well the unknown pattern matches the template, and then to choose the template with the best match score. However, we have significantly improved performance by comparing the warped unknown pattern with the template, using a neural network, as shown in Figure lb . The neural network is trained in advance to produce high match scores when the template and unknown pattern represent the same utterance, and low scores otherwise. Speaker-dependent recognition achieves accuracies of 98% with 30-word vocabularies.
Speaker verification. The RSC-164's speaker verification function operates very much like speaker-dependent recognition, although the training methodology and performance criterion are different. Speaker verification decisions can result in two types of errors. False accepts occur when the match score is high enough so that the unknown pattern is believed to match the special-purpose ICs, one based on speaker verification (Voice Password) and the other on speaker-dependent recognition (Voice Direct). The first products using Sensory's speech-recognition technology were available in late 1995. Current products include electronic learning aids (Fisher-Price, TigerPlayskool, Tomy, and VTecb) and speaker verification for automobile remote security systems (CrimeStoppers, Guardian International, Omega Research). Over a dozen other products are under development. Sensory will sell millions of neural network-based speechrecognition chips in 1996.
Neural networks for computer virus recognition
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We have developed a neural network for generic detection of a particular class of computer viruses-the so-called boot sector viruses that infect the boot sector of a floppy disk or a hard drive. This is an important and relatively tractable subproblem of generic virus detection. Only about 5% of all known viruses are boot sector viruses, yet they account for nearly 90% of all virus incidents.' We have successfully deployed our neural network as a commercial stored password-that it is the same utter-' product, distributing it to millions of PC ance spoken by the same speaker. False rejects occur when the match score is too low, even though the speaker and the utterance are the same as in the stored password. By varying the match threshold, the RSC164 can trade off false accepts against false rejects. It can select the threshold to minimize either false accepts or false rejects. The equal error rate for speaker verificationwhen the threshold is set such that false acusers worldwide as part of the IBM AntiVirus software package.
We faced several challenges in taking our neural network from a research idea to a commercial product. These included designing an appropriate input representation scheme; dealing with the scarcity of available training data; finding an appropriate trade-off point between false positives and false negatives to conform to user expecta--cept and reject rates are equal-is 1.5%.
tions; and making the software conform to
Announced products. The RSC-164 recently received EDN Magazine 's "Innovation of the Year Award" in the ICs and strict constraints on memory and speed of computation needed to run on PCs. This essay discusses our methods for handling these challenges.
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AUGUST 1996 ed character PC boot sectors are 5 12 bytes long, and an input representation consisting of raw bits or bytes would clearly be infeasible. Instead, we developed a novel representation scheme that indicates the presence (1) or absence (0) of a few dozen features.
The features are short byte strings (specifically, trigrams) generated by an automated procedure from a corpus of training examples. The basic idea is that the features should appear frequently in viral boot sectors but infrequently in legitimate ones. In brief outline, we obtain the features by, first, forming a list of all trigrams contained in the corpus of viral boot sectors; second, eliminating trigrams that appear in any of the legitimate boot sectors in the corpus, or that appear too frequently in a separate corpus of uninfected PC programs; and then computing a "4-cover" of the viruses-extracting a list of features such that every virus in the training set contains at least four of the features in the list. This procedure winnows the list of trigram features from tens of thousands down to about 50.2 The available training data for this classification task was extremely limited: our entire data collection consisted of about 200 viral boot sectors and 100 legitimate boot sectors. Our experiments typically reserved 50% of the data for use as a validation set, leaving only about 100 viral examples and SO nonviral examples for training. With 50 input dimensions and such a small training set, we could train only single-layer networks with no hidden units. Even a few hidden units would make the number of weights in the network comparable to or greater than the number of exemplars, and thus create a likelihood of overfitting the training data.
A further problem with the training data is that, by construction, the legitimate boot sectors are all represented by a single input pattern consisting of all zeroes. Hence, any set of positive weights would achieve 100% classification accuracy on the training set. Clearly, this would lead to a bad generalization, as the network would produce a false positive for any legitimate boot sector that had any nonzero feature values. We addressed this problem by training as nonviral an additional set of input patterns with a single input set to 1 and all others set to 0. This step enforced the constraint that no single input feature in isolation should be sufficient to indicate viralness. We also generated additional artificial exemplars using the 5 12-byte strings, starting from the entry points in our corpus of PC programs. (The thought was that these sections of code, like real boot sectors. might be oriented to machine setup rather than performance of applications.) This procedure yielded another several hundred nontrivial patterns, containing some nonzero inputs, that were trained as nonviral exemplars.
In typical training runs with backpropagation, we found that the network achieved 90-95% classification accuracy on the training data, using a classification threshold of 0.5. That is, patterns scoring greater than 0.5 were classified as viral, while pattems scoring less than 0.5 were classified as nonviral. (We did not achieve 100% accuracy because a few of the less robust input features were deleted.) Performance on the validation sets was typically 80-85% for the viral boot sectors and 100% for the legitimate boot sectors. That is, the false negative rate was 15-20%, and the false positive rate was lower than the resolution of our validation set (about 1 %).
For practical boot virus detection, we need to place more emphasis on false positives than false negatives. False positives are potentially much more frequent, because a false positive on one legitimate boot sector will mean false positive events on thousands of computers. In the field, the network should operate at a classification threshold higher than 0.5. It is difficult to choose an appropriate threshold value, because there is so little data, and because, at a threshold of 0.5, the false positive rate is already quite low. After consulting with virus experts in our group, we settled on a threshold value of approximately 0.7, a level deemed to provide an adequate safety cushion for false positives, while only slightly increasing (by a few percent) the false negative rate.
The neural net's performance in the field has, in fact, been excellent, consistent with our expectations based on the validation set measurements. The classifier, incorporated into IBM Antivirus, has caught approximately 75% of new boot sector viruses that have come out since the product was released. Most of the viruses that escaped detection did so not because they failed to contain the feature trigrams but because the code sections containing them were obscured in various ways. We are working on independent means for capturing the obscured code, which should enable the program to detect most of these viruses. Also, to our knowledge, only two false positives have appeared since the initial product release, both on boot sectors that human experts think have suspicious virus-like qualities. Subsequent product releases have easily eliminated these false positives by using specific exception-handling code.
into IBM Antivirus, we faced severe constraints on CPU, memory, and disk-space use. IBM Antivirus is already a substantial PC program and must run on minimal machines with little memory, older CPUs, and so forth. This places a premium on all computational resources, and the neural-net code must squeeze into a memory footprint of at most a few kilobytes. So, we needed to recast the neural net's floating-point arithmetic in integer form. We stored the weights as low-precision integers (using about S to 6 bits) and eliminated the sigmoidal output. These conversions are manageable in a small, single-layer net. However, the memory-footprint and CPU-usage issues present considerable obstacles to commercial use of larger multilayer nets.
In incorporating the neural-net classifier
